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ABSTRACT
This Article presents the results of a survey of jurors in federal
and state court on their use of social media during their jury
service. We began surveying federal jurors in 2011 and reported
preliminary results in 2012; since then, we have surveyed several
hundred more jurors, including state jurors, for a more complete
picture of juror attitudes toward social media. Our results support
the growing consensus that jury instructions are the most effective
tool to mitigate the risk of juror misconduct through social media.
We conclude with a set of recommended best practices for using a
social-media instruction.

Copyright © 2014 by Hon. Amy J. St. Eve, Hon. Charles P. Burns, and Michael A.
Zuckerman. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect those of the courts or the law firm with which they are
respectively associated.
†
United States District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois; Adjunct Professor, Northwestern Law School.
††
Circuit Judge, Criminal Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; Adjunct
Professor, Lewis University.
‡
Associate, Jones Day, Chicago Office. Mr. Zuckerman previously clerked for
Judge St. Eve, before which he clerked for U.S. Circuit Judge Eric L. Clay of the
Sixth Circuit, and U.S. Magistrate Judge Cheryl L. Pollak of the Eastern District of
New York.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

65

Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................ 66	
  
I. Recent Developments in Social Media ............................................... 67	
  
A. The Revolution Continues ............................................................ 67	
  
B. The Threats to Jury Impartiality Remain ...................................... 69	
  
C. Recent Case Law on Jurors & Social Media ................................. 72	
  
1. The Trial Court’s Duty to Investigate—State v. Smith .............. 72	
  
2. What’s in a Friend?—Sluss v. Commonwealth .......................... 74	
  
3. The Limits on Proactive Measures—Steiner v. Superior Court 76	
  
II. The Informal Survey of Actual Jurors ............................................... 78	
  
A. Background on the Survey ............................................................ 78	
  
B. The Results .................................................................................... 79	
  
1. Analysis of Responses from Jurors Who Were Tempted .......... 80	
  
2. Analysis of Responses from Jurors Who Were Not Tempted ... 82	
  
III. Best Practices for Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of Social
Media ..................................................................................................... 86	
  
A. Employ a Social-Media Instruction .............................................. 86	
  
B. Instruct on Social Media Early and Often ..................................... 87	
  
C. Make the Instruction Effective ...................................................... 88	
  
1. Hit Social Media on Its Head ..................................................... 88	
  
2. Include a Meaningful Explanation ............................................. 89	
  
3. Remind Jurors of Their Oath and Its Importance ...................... 89	
  
4. Don’t Forget the Basics ............................................................. 90	
  
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 90	
  

66

MORE FROM THE #JURY BOX

[Vol. 12

INTRODUCTION
Born out a common-law tradition and guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution, the impartial jury is one of the most fundamental American
institutions. It is also one of the most resilient. The impartial jury has
survived the telephone, the radio, the automobile, and the television.1 There
is no reason why it cannot survive Facebook and Twitter, too. But to ensure
the continued fairness and integrity of the jury system, the legal profession
must be proactive and vigilant in addressing juror misconduct through
social media.2
In mid-2011, against a rise in reported instances of juror
misconduct through social media, U.S. District Court Judge Amy St. Eve
began an informal survey of actual jurors. The survey asked jurors at the
conclusion of their service whether they had been tempted to communicate
about the case through social media and, if so, what prevented them from
doing so. Based on 140 responses from jurors in federal court, we reported
in a March 2012 article that the survey data supported the growing
consensus in the legal profession that courts should specifically instruct
jurors not to use social media to communicate about the case.3
In this Article, we introduce 443 additional responses from jurors in
both federal and state court, and revisit the informal survey results anew,
with assistance from an additional co-author. Part I discusses social-media
developments since our last article and highlights three recent judicial
opinions. Part II presents the results of the informal survey. As we explain
in Part III, the results continue to support the emerging consensus that jury
instructions are the most effective tool to mitigate the risk of juror
misconduct through social media. Although the informal survey results are
not scientific, we hope that they will further the dialogue by adding the
voices of actual jurors.

1

See, e.g., Catharine Skipp, Jurors’ TV Viewing Is Growing Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1989, at B1 (describing potential effects of both television and movies on
juror sympathies); Jurors Forbidden To Listen On Radio, WASH. HERALD, Oct. 24,
1922, at 8 (covering “the first time in history” that jurors were instructed not to
listen to the details of a trial being broadcast on radio).
2
State v. Smith, No. M2010-01384, 2013 WL 4804845, at *9 (Tenn. Sept. 10,
2013) (“The American judicial system ‘depends upon public confidence in the
jury’s verdict.’” (quoting United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1186 (11th
Cir. 2011)).
3
See Hon. Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in
the Age of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2012).
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I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL MEDIA
A. The Revolution Continues
Social media has continued to grow in both usage and influence.4
More than ever, Americans of all ages are joining and using Facebook,
Twitter, LinkedIn, and other social networks.5 George H.W. Bush, for
example, recently became the third U.S. President on Twitter.6 Facebook
now has more than 1.1 billion users who, every minute, post 243,000 photos
to the network, up from 208,000 a year ago.7 Twitter’s expanding user base
now “tweets” 350,000 comments every minute, up from 100,000 a year
ago.8 And every minute, 120 new LinkedIn accounts are created, up from
100 a year ago.9 These dizzying numbers are just the tip of the iceberg—
there are hundreds of other social networks, and new ones are popping up
all of the time.10
4

Anthony Carranza, Social Media Networking Stats and Trends in 2013,
EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/social-medianetworking-stats-and-trends-2013; see also Ryan Holmes, 5 Predictions for Social
Media in 2014, CNNMONEY (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:44 PM),
http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/12/10/social-media-2014 (predicting that “upstart”
social networks will “catch fire”); Shea Bennetet, Social Media Growth
Worldwide—2 Billion Users By 2016, Led by India, MEDIA BISTRO (Nov. 19, 2013,
3:00
PM),
http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/social-media-growthworldwide_b51877 (“[T]he huge opportunity to recruit new users in less-developed
markets [will] ensur[e] that the social networking uptick will continue for years to
come.”).
5
See Drew Desilver, Chart of the Week: A Minute on the Internet, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/11/27/chartof-the-week-a-minute-on-the-internet (“Keeping up with what people do online is
no easy task . . . .”); Belle Beth Cooper, 10 Surprising Social Media Statistics That
Will Make You Rethink Your Social Strategy, FASTCOMPANY (Nov. 18, 2013, 5:52
AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3021749/work-smart/10-surprising-socialmedia-statistics-that-will-make-you-rethink-your-social-stra (reporting that baby
boomers are one of the fastest growing demographics on social media).
6
Chris Taylor, George H.W. Bush is Third U.S. President to Join Twitter,
MASHABLE (Dec. 10, 2012), http://mashable.com/2013/12/10/president-bushtwitter. The other two are Presidents Obama and Clinton. Id.
7
Desilver, supra note 5.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Teenagers Prove Fickle When Choosing Social Networks,
N.Y.
TIMES
BITS
BLOG
(Oct.
26,
2013,
12:07
PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/26/teens-prove-fickle-when-choosing-theirfavorite-social-network (discussing changing attitudes about particular social
networks); Adrienne Erin, New Social Networks You Didn’t Know About (Until
Now!), AL.COM (July 15, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://www.al.com/living/index.ssf/
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The legal profession continues to embrace social media, but it has
been forced to confront difficult questions.11 What are the limits on
researching a juror through social media?12 Can a judge have a social-media
profile?13 What is the evidentiary value of a Facebook “like”?14 Can socialmedia activity give rise to personal jurisdiction?15 How can courts best
manage increased public awareness of judicial proceedings?16 These and
other important questions have not stopped social media from taking hold in

2013/07/new_social_networks_you_didnt.html
(discussing
“Srgrouples,”
“NextDoor,” and “Path”); Bob Al-Greene, 10 Hot Social Networks to Watch,
MASHABLE (May 29, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/05/29/10-hot-socialnetworks (discussing “Medium,” “Kleek,” “Viddy,” “RunKeeper,” “Ghost,”
“Pose,” “Vine,” “Atmospheir,” “Days,” and “App.net”).
11
E.g., Nancy L. Ripperger, Ethics: Facebook—Friend or Foe? What Are the
Ethical Risks of Using Facebook in Your Litigation Practice?, PRECEDENT
MAGAZINE, Summer 2013, at 36–38, available at http://www.mobar.org/
uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Precedent/2013/Fall/facebook.pdf.
12
See, e.g., Michelle Celarier, Ex-SAC Exec’s Defense Probes Jurors’ Social Media
Postings, N.Y. POST (Nov. 18, 2013, 11:57 PM), http://nypost.com/2013/11/18/exsac-execs-defense-probes-jurors-social-media-postings (reporting on a jury
consulting firm “doing an extra level of due diligence on prospective jurors by
Googling their names, checking out their social-media profiles and looking into
public sites for asset searches”).
13
Yes, according to ABA Formal Opinion 462 (Feb. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/formal_opinion_462.authcheckdam.pdf. A related
question is whether judges and lawyers may connect to each other on social media.
See Jane Musgrave, Florida High Court Asked to Decide Whether Judges, Lawyers
Can Be Facebook Friends, PALM BEACH POST (Jan. 16. 2013, 7:29 PM),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/crime-law/state-high-court-asked-todecide-whether-judges-la/nTyhj.
14
See, e.g., Ebersole v. Kline-Perry, No. 12-CV-00026, 2012 WL 3776489, at *5
(E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2012) (“The greater the number of ‘likes’ on the page, the more
likely it is that others visited the page . . . . The evidence was therefore relevant as
to how widely disseminated the letter was . . . .”).
15
See, e.g., NobelBiz, Inc. v. Veracity Networks, LLC, No. 13-CV-02518, 2013
WL 5425101, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013) (rejecting broad-based argument that
“all activity on social media sites is a form of advertising subjecting the account
holding to personal jurisdiction wherever his or her social media account may be
viewed”).
16
See, e.g., Douglas Dowty, Rick Springfield Mistrial a First for Social Media’s
Impact in Central New York, SYRACUSE.COM (Nov. 20, 2013, 3:23 PM),
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/11/social_media_a_whole_new_
game_in_cases_like_rick_springfield_mistrial.html (reporting on a mistrial
declared during deliberations after new evidence surfaced from a social-media site,
corroborating the plaintiff’s claims).
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law offices and courthouses across the country.17 According to a recent
report, 80 percent of the nation’s largest law firms have blogs;18 many of
them are also on Facebook and other social networks.19 Eighty-one percent
of lawyers use social media.20 Federal and state courts increasingly do
too21—are you following @illinoiscourts on Twitter?

B. The Threats to Jury Impartiality Remain
In our prior article, we explained how social networking by jurors
carries with it the dangerous potential to undermine the fundamental
fairness of jury trials.22 This potential, unfortunately, continues to become
reality in myriad reported cases.23 In our previous work, we offered

17

See Simon Chester & Daniel Del Gobbo, Social Media Networking For Lawyers:
A Practical Guide to Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and Blogging, LAW PRACTICE
MAGAZINE, Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 28, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/law_practice_magazine/2012/january_february/social-medianetworking-for-lawyers.html (“What a difference five years makes. Social media
has exploded.”).
18
See Adrian Dayton, You Read It Here: Blogs Never Sleep, NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL (Sept. 16, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202619190022.
19
See generally GUY ALVAREZ, BRIAN DALTON, JOE LAMPORT & KRISTINA
TSAMIS, THE SOCIAL LAW FIRM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE USE OF SOCIAL
TECHNOLOGIES AT AMERICA’S LEADING LAW FIRMS (2013), available at
http://good2bsocial.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/THE-SOCIAL-LAWFIRM.pdf.
20
See Stephen Fairly, ABA Survey Says Lawyers Getting Clients Via Social Media,
NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
aba-survey-says-lawyers-getting-clients-social-media (citing ABA LEGAL
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT (2013)); see also Nicole Black, Lawyers Get
Creative With Use of Social Media, SUI GENERIS (Oct. 8, 2013, 2:27 PM),
http://nylawblog.typepad.com/suigeneris/2013/10/lawyers-get-creative-with-use-ofsocial-media.html.
21
See generally CONFERENCE OF COURT PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICERS, 2013
CCPIO NEW MEDIA SURVEY (2013), available at http://ccpio.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/2013-New-Media-Survey-Report_CCPIO.pdf.
22
See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3, at 9. Social media creates problems
elsewhere in the justice system too. See, e.g., James Staas, Man Convicted of
Witness Intimidation After Grand Jury Testimony Is Posted on Facebook, BUFFALO
NEWS (Oct. 30, 2013, 2:38 PM), http://www.buffalonews.com/city-region/eriecounty-court/man-convicted-of-witness-intimidation-after-grand-jury-testimony-isposted-on-facebook-20131030.
23
E.g., Naomi Martin, Juror in David Warren Trial Was Booted Because He Used
Social Media, NOLA.COM (Dec. 6, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/
index.ssf/2013/12/juror_in_david_warren_trial_wa.html; Mark Pearson, When
Jurors Go ‘Rogue’ on the Internet and Social Media, JOURNLAW (May 30, 2013,
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numerous examples; now, based on recent reports, we offer even more.24
These examples are an important reminder that judges and lawyers must
remain vigilant in their efforts to ensure a fair trial in the age of social
media.25
Facebook remains a popular vehicle through which jurors commit
misconduct. Consider, for example, the juror in Mississippi, who posted on
Facebook: “I guess all I need to know is GUILTY. lol.”26 Or the juror from
across the Pond, who posted: “Woooow I wasn’t expecting to be in a jury
Deciding a paedophile’s fate, I’ve always wanted to F**k up a paedophile
& now I’m within the law!”27 Another recent example comes from a
wrongful-death trial in Missouri, throughout which the jury foreperson
regularly communicated about the case on Facebook.28 Some examples of
the Facebook communications include:
•

Juror:

“Got picked for jury duty.”

•

Juror:

“Sworn to secrecy as to details of this
case. Most importantly . . . the 3:00 p.m.
Cocktail hour is not observed!”

2:12 PM), http://journlaw.com/2013/05/30/when-jurors-go-rogue-on-the-internetand-social-media.
24
Published reports, of course, do not capture every instance of juror misconduct.
Some of it goes undetected or cannot be proved. See, e.g., Kervick v. Silver Hill
Hosp., 72 A.3d 1044, 1065 & n.13 (Conn. 2013) (rejecting claim that juror posted
comments online about the trial where the comments were posted anonymously and
there was no reliable evidence that a real juror actually posted them during trial).
25
Cf. Martin, supra note 23 (“Use of social media by jurors in trials has become an
increasing concern for judges and lawyers around the country. The worry is jurors
will be exposed to information about the case that they are prohibited from
seeing—such as news accounts that contain information not admitted in court—and
that they will share information about the trial, which they are prohibited from
doing while they are serving on the jury.”).
26
Shaw v. State, No. 2011-KA-01536-COA, 2013 WL 5533080, at *8 (Miss. Ct.
App. Oct. 08, 2013). The offending jurors also friended a trial witness on Facebook.
Id. Even so, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for
mistrial. Id.
27
See Juror Jailed Over Pedophile Facebook Post, METRO NEWS (July 29, 2013,
5:09 PM), http://metro.co.uk/2013/07/29/juror-jailed-over-paedophile-facebookpost-3903315; John Aston, Two Jurors Jailed for Contempt of Court Over Use of
Internet During Trials, THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (July 30, 2013),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/two-jurors-jailed-for-contempt-ofcourt-over-use-of-internet-during-trials-8737004.html.
28
Sylvia Hsieh, Juror’s Facebook Posts May Overturn Wrongful Death Verdict,
LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 14, 2013), http://blogs.lawyers.com/2013/02/jurors-facebookposts-overturn-verdict. The offending juror was jailed for two months for contempt.
Id.
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•

Friend:

“If he’s cute and has a nice butt, he’s
innocent!”

Juror:

“Drunk and having a great food at our fav
neighborhood hangout.”
“I’m still amazed they allow jurors to nip
from a flask all day.”

Friend:
•

Juror:
Friend:

“Starting day 8 of jury service.”
“Remember nice ass = innocent!”

•

Juror:

“Civic duty fulfilled and justice served.
Now, where’s my cocktail????”
“Was it Miss Peacock in the library with
the lead pipe?”

Friend:
•

Juror:

71

“Civil case . . . Verdict for the defendants
. . . . I was the jury forearm . . . .
deliberations and verdict . . . in under one
hour.”29

Not all recent reported examples of misconduct involve Facebook.
Jurors continue to blog about their jury service,30 like the California juror
who posted dozens of comments on her personal blog throughout a lengthy
trial.31 One of her early posts said: “[T]his is my secret blog. I don’t know
how secret it really is though. I want to tell secret jury things.”32 As
described in other recent reports, a juror discussed the case on a
newspaper’s online comment board,33 and another did online research about
a witness and the judge.34 One juror even communicated from her mobile
29

Id.
See, e.g., McNeely v. Cate, No. 11-56393, 2013 WL 5651267 (9th Cir. Oct. 17,
2013) (considering a habeas claim based on the jury foreperson’s blog post during
trial); Figueroa v. Highline Med. Ctr., No. 68272-5-I, 2013 WL 5636674, at *7
(Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2013) (summarizing a juror’s blog postings during trial as
“limited and innocuous”).
31
People v. Johnson, No. F057736, 2013 WL 5366390 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 25,
2013).
32
Id. at *133. The juror apparently posted, among other things, “hypothetical”
questions related to the case. “At least one of her posts drew a comment from a
family member who ‘love[d]’ the blogger’s ‘hypothetical question to a case that
you cannot talk about (let alone blog about).’” Id. (alteration in original).
33
See Michelle Bowman, States Punish Web-Cruising Jurors, LAWYERS.COM (June
18, 2013), http://blogs.lawyers.com/2013/06/states-cpunish-web-cruising-juror. The
trial court found the juror in criminal contempt. Id.
34
Drew Singer, Juror Misconduct Strikes Again at Jenkens Ally’s Trial,
LAW360.COM (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/483305/jurormisconduct-strikes-again-at-jenkens-atty-s-trial.
30
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device in plain sight of the judge.35 In that case, the judge noticed “an
unexpected glow on a juror’s chest while the courtroom lights were dimmed
during video evidence in an armed-robbery trial.”36 The light, it turned out,
was from the juror’s cell phone. He was texting.37

C. Recent Case Law on Jurors & Social Media
Jurors’ often brazen acts of misconduct have contributed to a
growing body of case law about jurors and social media. How should trial
courts respond to possible juror misconduct on social media? What does it
mean to be “friends” on Facebook? Are there limits on how courts can
respond? In this Section, we review some recent cases that have addressed
questions like these.
1. The Trial Court’s Duty to Investigate—State v. Smith
In State v. Smith,38 the Tennessee Supreme Court considered how a
trial court should react when it learns “during a jury’s deliberations that a
juror exchanged Facebook messages” with a witness.39 The issue arose out
of a murder prosecution in which Dr. Adele Lewis, a medical examiner
affiliated with Vanderbilt University, testified for the state.40 Though four of
the jurors were also affiliated with Vanderbilt, none of them were asked
during voir dire whether they knew Dr. Lewis.41 After the close of evidence,
the trial court charged the jury and instructed them to begin deliberations.42
Problems came to light about an hour later.43 Dr. Lewis informed
the trial judge that a juror had initiated a Facebook conversation with her.44
In an email to the judge, Dr. Lewis recounted the conversation:
[Juror]:

35

A-dele!! I thought you did a great job today on the
witness stand . . . I was in the jury . . . not sure if you

Oregon Juror Jailed for Texting During Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 18,
2013, 10:47 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/oregon-juror-jailed-texting-duringtrial. The judge held the juror in contempt of court and required him to spend the
night in county jail. Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. On the topic of texting, Facebook recently announced that its mobile app will
allow users to send each other Facebook messages with the ease of texting. See
Kurt Wagner, Facebook Makes Its Messenger App More Like Texting, MASHABLE
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/10/29/facebook-messenger-texting.
38
State v. Smith, No. M2010-01384, 2013 WL 4804845 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2013).
39
Id. at *1.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at *2.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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recognized me or not!! You really explained things so
great!!
[Dr. Lewis]: I was thinking that was you. There is a risk of a mistrial
if that gets out.
[Juror]:

I know . . . I didn’t say anything about you . . . there are
3 of us on the jury from Vandy and one is a physician
(cardiologist) so you may know him as well. It has been
an interesting case to say the least.45

The trial judge told the lawyers about the email at some point, but it
is unclear when, how, or what discussions took place.46 Deliberations went
on and the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, for which
he was sentenced to life in prison.47
Before the jury left the courthouse, defense counsel suggested that
the court examine the juror who communicated with Dr. Lewis.48 The court
flatly denied the request, being “satisfied with the communication that [it
had] gotten from Dr. Lewis with regard to the matter.”49 The intermediate
appellate court affirmed, but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed.
In a lengthy opinion, the state high court began by observing that,
“[l]ike judges, jurors must be—and must be perceived to be—disinterested
and impartial.”50 This means that the trial court must ensure that jurors
“base their verdict solely on the evidence introduced at trial.”51 If the trial
court learns of any inappropriate communications between a juror and a
third party, it must “assure that the juror has not been exposed to” any
improper information or influence.52 On the rise of social media, the high
court acknowledged that technology has “made it easier for jurors” to have
third-party contacts,53 but explained that “pre-internet” case law provides an
appropriate framework to address instances of juror misconduct committed
though social media.54
Applying these pre-internet principles, the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that the trial court failed to adequately investigate the “nature
and extent of the improper communications” between the juror and Dr.
45

Id.
Id.
47
Id. at *2–*3.
48
Id. at *3.
49
Id.
50
Id. at *4.
51
Id.
52
Id. at *5.
53
Id. at *7.
54
Id.
46
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Lewis.55 The court explained that, after learning of the communication, the
trial judge “was required to do more than simply inform the parties . . . and
then await the jury’s verdict.”56 The trial judge should have “immediately”
conducted a “hearing in open court to obtain all the relevant facts
surrounding the extra-judicial communication,” including its impact on the
juror’s “ability to serve as a juror” and whether any improper information
was shared with other jurors.57 Without such a hearing, the record was
inadequate and the case was remanded with instructions to conduct a
hearing.58
The state high court concluded its opinion with a comment on the
digital age. Observing that the judicial process depends on public
confidence in its outcomes, the court cautioned that juror communications
about a case on social media could erode that confidence.59 More than that,
the court continued, juror misconduct through social media threatens the
fundamental American guarantee of a fair trial.60 And so for these reasons,
the court admonished trial courts “to take additional precautions to assure
that jurors understand their obligation to base their decisions only on the
evidence admitted in court.”61 Specifically, the court explained:
Trial courts should give jurors specific, understandable instructions
that prohibit extra-judicial communications with third parties and the
use of technology to obtain facts that have not been presented in
evidence. Trial courts should clearly prohibit jurors’ use of devices
such as smart phones and tablet computers to access social media
websites or applications to discuss, communicate, or research anything
about the trial. In addition, trial courts should inform jurors that their
failure to adhere to these prohibitions may result in a mistrial and
could expose them to a citation for contempt. Trial courts should
deliver these instructions and admonitions on more than one
occasion.62

2. What’s in a Friend?—Sluss v. Commonwealth
The meaning of a Facebook friendship has become increasingly
significant as parties begin to cry foul over jurors’ undisclosed Facebook

55

Id. at *9.
Id. at *7.
57
Id.
58
Id. at *8.
59
Id. at *9 (citing St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3, at 12).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
56
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connections.63 In Sluss v. Commonwealth,64 for example, the Kentucky
Supreme Court considered the defendant’s claim of juror bias based on,
among other things, two jurors’ undisclosed Facebook friendships with the
victim’s mother.65
The case arose out of the tragic death of eleven-year-old Destiny
Brewer, who died when Ross Brandon Sluss crashed his truck into a vehicle
carrying her.66 Sluss, who was intoxicated at the time, was later charged
with murder and other offenses.67 The case was in the public eye from the
beginning and community members “took to the internet to discuss the
incident and the upcoming trial on websites such as Facebook and Topix.”68
At Sluss’ trial, the jurors were asked during general voir dire if they
knew the victim or her family.69 Two jurors—call them Juror 1 and Juror
2—said nothing.70 None of the jurors were asked if they were “Facebook
friends” with the victim or her family.71 Then, during individual voir dire,
Juror 1 stated that she had a Facebook account from which she knew only
that the murder “happened.”72 Juror 2 stated that she was not on Facebook
and knew nothing of the murder.73 Jurors 1 and 2 sat on the actual jury,
which found Sluss guilty of murder.74
Defense counsel later discovered that both jurors were “Facebook
friends” with the victim’s mother, whose Facebook profile contained
information about her daughter’s death.75 Counsel proffered screenshots of
the pertinent Facebook pages to the trial court and unsuccessfully moved for
a new trial.76

63

See, e.g., W.G.M. v. State, No. CR-12-0472, 2013 WL 4710406, at *1–*4 (Ala.
Crim. App. Aug. 30, 2013) (rejecting claim of juror misconduct based on
undisclosed Facebook friendship because (1) juror was never asked about socialnetworking relationships during voir dire; and (2) “the status of being a ‘friend’ on
Facebook does not necessarily equate to a close relationship from which a bias
could be presumed”).
64
Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215 (Ky. 2012).
65
Id. at 217.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 218.
68
Id. at 221.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 222.
74
Id. at 221–22.
75
Id.
76
Id.
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Sluss then appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, arguing
primarily that “the mere fact that each juror was a ‘Facebook friend’ with
[the victim’s mother] creates a presumption of juror bias and should have
been disclosed during voir dire.”77 Not so, the court explained: Facebook
friendships “do not necessarily carry the same weight as true friendships or
relationships in the community, which are generally the concern during voir
dire.”78 Some people, like the victim’s mother, have thousands of Facebook
friends, and the nature of each friendship “varies greatly, from passing
acquaintanceships . . . to close friends and family.”79 As such, the court
concluded that “a juror who is a ‘Facebook friend’ with a family member of
a victim, standing alone, is arguably not enough evidence to presume juror
bias sufficient to require a new trial”; what matters is the actual nature of
friendship.80
Although mere Facebook friendships were not enough, the court
was troubled by the jurors’ apparent misstatements during voir dire and also
the trial court’s inadequate investigation of the relationship between the
jurors and the victim’s mother.81 The state supreme court accordingly
reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to consider, among other
things, whether the jurors lied during voir dire about their Facebook usage;
whether the jurors were, in fact, Facebook friends with the victim’s mother
and, if so, when they became friends; and the nature and extent of any
actual friendships between the jurors and the victim’s mother.82
3. The Limits on Proactive Measures—Steiner v. Superior Court
Many courts and lawyers now appreciate the challenge of ensuring
an impartial jury in the age of social media. In the high-profile prosecution
of Jodi Arias, for example, defense counsel sought an order requiring the
jurors to reveal their Twitter usernames “so their accounts can be monitored
for communications about the case.”83 (The court denied the motion.84)
Some attempts to ensure impartiality, however, have gone too far.
Take, for example, the judicially imposed restrictions at issue in Steiner v.
77

Id. at 222.
Id.
79
Id. (explaining further that “Facebook allows only one binary choice between
two individuals where they either are ‘friends’ or are not ‘friends,’ with no status in
between”).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 223–24.
82
Id. at 229.
83
See Motion on Arias Jurors’ Twitter Handles Denied, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec.
4, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/story/24135483/motion-onarias-jurors-twitter-handles-denied.
84
See id.
78
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Superior Court.85 Steiner began as an ordinary tort case in which the
plaintiff alleged injuries from asbestos in the defendants’ products.86 As the
case moved towards trial, however, the defendants became concerned that
jurors would “Google” the plaintiff’s attorney, Simone Farrise, and see
statements on her website about victories in similar cases.87 After jury
selection, but before opening statements, the defendants asked the trial court
to order Farrise to remove those references for the duration of the trial.88
Farrise objected, but the trial court shared the defendants’ concern and so
granted their request.89 The court also “admonished the jurors not to Google
the attorneys.”90
After trial, Farrise restored her website and then appealed both the
jury verdict (which was for the defendants) and the trial court’s order
directed at her website. Though the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
verdict, it found error in the trial court’s order requiring Farrise to take
down portions of her website.91 As the appellate court explained, the order
was overbroad and constituted “an unlawful prior restraint on the attorney’s
free speech rights under the First Amendment.”92 Prophylactic measures
directed at a website unrelated to the case went “too far.”93 “Juror
85

Steiner v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). There are
other examples too. E.g., Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Gov’t,
731 F.3d 488, 494–96 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2013) (reversing district court’s order
shutting down a website in advance of jury selection); William R. Levesque,
Seizure of Juror’s Computer Rescinded, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, at 1B
(reporting that a federal judge ordered the U.S. Marshalls to seize a former juror’s
personal computer after allegations of Internet misconduct arose after her service;
the judge rescinded the order after the prosecutor raised due process concerns). On
the limits of the trial court’s investigative power, see, for example, Richard
Raysman & Peter Brown, Social Media Use As Evidence of Juror Misconduct, 11
INTERNET L. & STRATEGY 5, 3 (2013).
86
Steiner, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 157.
87
Id. at 158.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
For the discerning reader who wonders why the trial court’s order was not moot,
the order was indeed moot, but the appellate court concluded that the public interest
warranted consideration of the issue. Id. at 160 (“The actual order . . . does raise
questions as to a trial court’s authority to issue an order restricting an attorney’s
free speech rights during trial to prevent potential jury contamination. Because any
order restricting such speech during trial is likely to become moot before [an
appeal] can be heard, we agree it raises an issue of broad public interest that is
likely to evade timely review.” (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 546–47 (1976)).
92
Steiner, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 157.
93
Id. at 166.
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admonitions and instructions, such as those given here, were the
presumptively adequate means of addressing the threat of jury
contamination in this case.”94

II. THE INFORMAL SURVEY OF ACTUAL JURORS
In March 2012, we reported the preliminary results of our informal
survey of actual jurors.95 We had 140 responses at that time, all from jurors
in federal court. Now, with 443 additional responses from jurors in both
federal and state court, we revisit the results anew. As explained below, the
results show a small but significant number of jurors who were tempted to
communicate about the case through social media. Almost all of these jurors
ultimately decided not to do so because of the court’s social-media
instruction. Even jurors who were not tempted to communicate about the
case through social media indicated that the court’s instruction was effective
in keeping their temptation at bay. After briefly describing the survey, we
turn to the numbers and then share comments from the jurors themselves.

A. Background on the Survey
For more than three years, actual jurors in Illinois have been asked
to complete a short survey at the conclusion of their jury service. The
survey began with jurors in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, and about a year ago expanded to jurors in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Criminal Division. All survey responses were anonymous.
Each participating juror sat in either a federal criminal or civil case
in the Northern District of Illinois or a state criminal case in Cook County,
Illinois. The federal cases were presided over primarily by Judge Amy J. St.
Eve.96 Judge Charles P. Burns presided over all of the state criminal cases.
In every case, the presiding judge administered a model social-media
instruction during opening and closing instructions.97 Additionally, in many
of the longer trials, the judge daily admonished jurors not to communicate
about the case through social media.
The survey asked the jurors about their experience and included
these questions about social-media use during trial:

94

Id. at 157.
See generally St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3.
96
U.S. District Judge Matthew F. Kennelly presided over some of the early cases.
97
For the text of the model instructions on which the actual instructions were
based, see Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management, Proposed Model Jury Instructions: The Use of Electronic Technology
to Conduct Research on or Communicate About a Case (June 2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2012/jury-instructions.pdf.
95
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Were you tempted to communicate about the case through any social
networks, such as Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, YouTube or
Twitter?
If so, what prevented you from doing so?98

The results that follow are not scientific, nor are they intended to
be.99 Perhaps most significantly, juror participation was voluntary and some
jurors may not have been candid (though juror anonymity likely encouraged
candor).100 Despite their informality, the results are nonetheless instructive
in navigating the social-media minefield. In addition to the numerical tally,
the results come together to form one of the largest collections of comments
from actual jurors about social media.

B. The Results
To date, 583 jurors have participated in the informal survey,
representing 358 jurors from federal court and 225 jurors from state court.
The first question asked the juror whether she was tempted to communicate
about the case through social media. Jurors from both federal and state court
overwhelmingly responded in the negative, though a sizable, significant
minority said “yes” or some equivalent.101 Here is the breakdown:
Total
Not tempted
Tempted
No Response

Number
583
520
47
16

Percent
-89.19%
8.06%
2.74%

Consistent with the preliminary results we reported in March 2012,
a significant number of jurors referenced the judge or the judge’s instruction
as the reason why they did not, or were not even tempted to, communicate
about the case on social media.

98

The full text of the Jury Questionnaire, together with jurors’ responses, is on file
with the authors.
99
See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3, at 21 & n.114 (acknowledging the
unscientific nature of the results).
100
See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT, & THOMAS S. ULEN,
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 77 (2010) (observing that respondent anonymity is
likely to increase response rate and accuracy in surveys about “sensitive
behaviors”).
101
We observed a slight uptick in the rate of temptation over time. Although no
hard conclusions can be drawn due to the unscientific nature of this survey, we
believe this may be an area ripe for future inquiry.
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Notably, the results from federal and state court are nearly identical.
We observed almost the exact same rates of temptation and response across
both forums:

Total
Not tempted
Tempted
No Response

Number
358
317
30
11

Federal
Percent
-88.55%
8.38%
3.07%

State
Number
225
203
17
5

Percent
-90.22%
7.55%
2.22%

We also observed similar comments from jurors in both forums. At
almost identical rates, federal and state jurors told us that the judge or the
judge’s instruction influenced them not to communicate about the case
through social media. Jurors across both forums also explained their
decision to refrain from social media by mentioning their oath, respect for
the judicial process, and integrity.
1. Analysis of Responses from Jurors Who Were Tempted
Across both forums, forty-seven jurors responded that they were
tempted to communicate about the case through social media. Forty-five of
the forty-seven tempted jurors said that they ultimately did not succumb to
their temptation. The two others said nothing either way—one stressed that
she was tempted to talk about her “experience” and not “content,” and the
other simply said that she was tempted to communicate with her “family.”
Asked what “prevented” them from communicating about the case
on social media, most of the forty-five jurors—forty-one of them—
referenced the court’s social-media instruction. One juror, for example, said
that she wanted to talk about the case on Facebook, but did not because of
“the Judge’s orders.” Others similarly made direct references to judge’s
social-media instruction in explaining what prevented them from giving in
to their temptation:
•

“Judge told us not to communicate”

•

“The request of the Judge”

•

“The Judge’s orders” (2 jurors)

•

“The Judge”

•

“Direct orders”

•

“I morally thought I should obey the Judge”

•

“The Judge saying not to”

•

“The Judge’s admonishment”
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•

“The Judge’s instructions”

•

“Instructions not to do it”

•

“Your instructions”

•

“Agreement with judge not to do so”

•

“ask[ed] not to”

•

“Judge’s orders and importance to the case”

•

“Nope. The judge was clear about not sharing the
information”

•

“I was instructed not to, and I tend to do the right
thing”

•

“I was tempted but told not to, so I follow[ed] the
rules”

•

“Wanted to but knew I could not”

•

“We were told not to”
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One juror, who likely sat in a longer trial, pointed to the judge’s
“daily warnings” (underline in original) as the reason for her restraint.
Repetition was important to another juror, who likewise explained that the
judge’s “repeated directions not to” communicate about the case on social
media were effective.
Other tempted jurors indirectly referred to the judge’s instruction in
explaining why they did not communicate about the case on social media.
At least two of them mentioned the “law”—“point of law” and “I have to be
loyal to the law”—and numerous others pointed to their oath or respect for
the process:
•

“I took an oath”

•

“My oath”

•

“I follow rules under the oath I made”

•

“I knew it was my duty to fulfill the oath I took before
the court not to say anything”

•

“My duty as a jur[or] under oath”

•

“Took oath not to communicate”

•

“My oath not to tell”

•

“I took this very seriously and wanted to do what I
swore I would”
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•

“I swore not to”

•

“I had to remind myself that this is a job and I made an
oath and was going to follow rules under the oath I
made”

•

“I was tempted, but my respect for the privilege of
service as a juror to our Court System prevented me
from doing so”

•

“I respect the process”

Consistent with the court’s instructions, others decided not to give
in to their social-media temptations because they understood that doing so
would threaten their impartiality. One juror, for example, was tempted by
Google but stayed offline in order “to keep an open mind.” Other jurors
explained their decision like this:
•

“I did not want to sway my opinion”

•

“To keep an open mind”

•

“Afraid I would be bias[ed]”

•

“Changing my personal opinion”

Although no jurors were threatened with contempt, two jurors
sought to avoid criminal sanctions; in their words:
•

“I didn’t want to ruin the trial or get arrested or
something”

•

“JAIL” (capitals in original)

In an apparent recognition of the mistrial that might result, one juror
decided not to communicate about the case in light of the “time invested of
all jurors.” Another juror similarly remarked that as the trial went on, her
temptation diminished because she “then had enough invested not to.”
2. Analysis of Responses from Jurors Who Were Not Tempted
The overwhelming majority of jurors—520 or 88.55 percent of the
sample—reported no temptation to communicate about the case through
social media. Some were emphatic about it:
•

“No not at all” (nine jurors)

•

“Absolutely not” (three jurors)

•

“No” (underline in original; ten jurors)

•

“No!”
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Although most jurors responded to the question about temptation by
stating simply “no” or some equivalent, about seventy jurors went further
without any prompt and explained why. The comments from these jurors
are revealing.
Similar to those from the tempted jurors, the comments from the
jurors who were not tempted overwhelmingly related to the court’s socialmedia instruction. Many jurors explicitly referenced the judge or the
instruction as the reason for their lack of temptation:
•

“The Judge’s orders” (three jurors)

•

“The Judge asked us not to”

•

“The Judge’s instruction” (two jurors)

•

“The Judge made it pretty clear not to”

•

“The Judge’s order not to discuss the case”

•

“The Judge said not to”

•

“Judge’s admonition to not communicate about the
case”

•

“instructed not to”

•

“stayed true to my given orders”

•

“Instructed by Judge not to”

•

“I was told not to”

•

“Because the Judge instructed us not to”

•

“The fact that we were not supposed to”

•

“did not want to break the rules”

•

“Jury instructions”

•

“The Judge”

•

“No, Judge said not to!”

•

“You told us not to”

•

“Judge asked us not to go online re: this case”

•

“Judge’s direction”

•

“the reminders from the judge were good all the same”

•

“Followed requests of court not to discuss”

84

MORE FROM THE #JURY BOX

•

“The warning”

•

“instructions from the Judge” (two jurors)

•

“was instructed not to”

•

“ordered not to look”
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One juror characterized the social-media instruction as a “gag
order” and explained that she did not discuss the case on social media
because “there was a gag order prohibiting us from discussing the trial.”
Two jurors said “the law,” and another remarked that “its against the law”
to communicate about the case through social media.
Other jurors’ explanations for their lack of temptation linked the
social-media instruction to principles of fairness:
•

“The Judge’s instructions and I did not want to
compromise the case”

•

“Judge’s direction [and] wanted to provide a fair and
unbiased decision”

•

“[The Judge] instructed us not to look through any
social networks. Besides, I want to hear and see
evidence of the case”

•

“My own personal belief but the judge’s orders”

Some jurors just referenced fairness as the reason for their lack of
temptation:
•

“Did not want to jeopardize proceeding in any way”

•

“I didn’t want to be biased in the case”

•

“I did not want to compromise the case”

For a handful of jurors, their lack of temptation and their juror oaths
went hand-in-hand:
•

“I was sworn to not say anything”

•

“it would have been improper once I was instructed
not to”

•

“My duty not to do so”

Others attributed their lack of temptation to something more
personal:
•

“promise to God”

•

“morally”
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•

“I took this very serious[ly] and kept my mouth shut”

•

“I was not going to undermine the integrity of the
process”

•

“Civic duty”

•

“My sense of integrity”

•

“Kept an open mind”

•

“did my job”

•

“Respect” (two jurors)

•

“Got home too late to think about going on Facebook
:)”
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For one juror, refraining from prohibited social-media
communications was a source of personal pride: “I was proud of the fact
that we, as a jury, did not discuss the case until it came time for
deliberations.” For another, it was out of “fear,” presumably another
reference to being held in contempt for violating the court’s instruction.
And since jurors, after all, are human, one remarked that “nothing” could
prevent her from using social media to communicate about the case,
although she insisted she was not tempted to do so.
Finally, in reporting no temptation, twenty jurors explained that
they do not use (or have no interest in ever using) social-networking
services. Thirteen of them, or 65 percent, were from federal court, with the
remaining seven jurors, or 35 percent, from state court. Additionally, the
rate of jurors reporting that they do not use social media increased with time
in both federal and state court. The comments from these jurors are a good
reminder that, despite the rise of social media, not every juror is a user.
Some of their comments include:
•

“not big on technology!” (underline in original)

•

“don’t use any of those”

•

“I don’t use them, except for LinkedIn but I do not
‘chat’ on the Internet”

•

“don’t use them”

•

“I do not use social networks”

•

“I do not use any of those social networks ever”

•

“don’t use those things much”

•

“I don’t have any accounts”
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•

“I very rarely use these networks”

•

“I don’t use social networks to communicate”

•

“No interest”

•

“I am not on any of those networks. Just follow
Twitter but do not Tweet”

•

“I don’t really do ‘social networks’”

•

“No, I don’t use that too much”

•

“I don’t ‘social network’ anyway”

•

“don’t use those elect. gadgets”

•

“I don’t use social networks much”

•

“not on social networks”

•

“not interested”

•

“didn’t want to”

•

“don’t use those sites”

•

“don’t have, don’t care”

•

“I don’t use them”

III. BEST PRACTICES FOR ENSURING AN IMPARTIAL JURY IN THE
AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
A. Employ a Social-Media Instruction
The informal survey responses, though unscientific, support the
emerging majority view that the best way to ensure an impartial jury in the
age of social media is through carefully crafted jury instructions.102 As
borne out by jurors in our sample, such instructions can effectively mitigate
the risks of juror misconduct associated with social media. As dozens of
jurors told us, they did not communicate about the case on social media
because of the “Judge’s instruction,” or because “[t]he Judge made it pretty
clear not to.”
Unlike more draconian tools like threats of imprisonment and
blanket technology bans, social-media instructions are more respectful of

102

Christian Nolan, Supreme Court Requires Jury Instruction to Avoid Social
Media, CONN. LAW. TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2013, 6:22 PM), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/
id=1202614781226 (describing the practices of the Connecticut state court system).
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jurors, and less likely to negatively impact their willingness to serve.103
Trial judges are intimately familiar with instructing juries and have
traditionally relied on instructions as the primary defense against
misconduct.104 There is no reason to deviate now. The law presumes that
jurors will follow their instructions,105 and in the social-media context,
scores of actual jurors told us that they actually did.106
Social-media instructions may not prevent every instance of juror
misconduct. Instructions are not a silver bullet, but there likely is none; after
all, the jury system is “fundamentally human”107 and therefore entails a
“risk of human fallibility.”108 But as experience, studies and our informal
survey results support, a social-media instruction is a necessary and often
independently sufficient method to minimize, if not eliminate, the risk of
juror misconduct through social media. Resolving to employ a social-media
instruction, however, is only the beginning. There are further questions of
timing and content.

B. Instruct on Social Media Early and Often
Courts should instruct juries on social media early and often. We
suggest an instruction in the judge’s opening remarks to the jury, as a part
of the judge’s closing instructions before the jury begins deliberations, and
daily in trials spanning several days. Indeed, one of the jurors in our sample
lauded the judge for the “daily” instruction. Another said that she was
tempted at the beginning but less so over time, which underscores the
importance of repetition.109

103

See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 577 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (observing that the
integrity of our jury system depends on full public participation in the process).
104
See Steiner v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
(“It is well established that ‘frequent and specific cautionary admonitions and jury
instructions . . . constitute the accepted, presumptively adequate, and plainly less
restrictive means of dealing with the threat of jury contamination.’” (citation
omitted) (modification in original)).
105
See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is presumed to
follow its instructions.”).
106
See supra Part II.B.2.
107
People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
108
Anderson v. Fuller, 455 U.S. 1028, 1033 (1982); see also Rideau v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is an impossible standard to
require that tribunal to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from any
external factors.”).
109
See also State v. Smith, No. M2010-01384, 2013 WL 4804845, at *9 (Tenn.
Sept. 10, 2013) (“Trial courts should deliver [social-media and Internet-related]
instructions and admonitions on more than one occasion.”).
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C. Make the Instruction Effective
The mere existence of a social-media instruction, without regard to
content, might be enough for some jurors, as it was for two jurors in our
sample. One juror said, “I am an honest person so knowing I had rules to
follow made it easy.” Another juror agreed: “I am a rule follower.” Though
not unique, jurors of this type are rare.
For most jurors, the content of the social-media instruction is what
matters. Our prior article provided some suggestions about effective content
and highlighted the numerous articles and model instructions that can guide
the reader on the subject. We take the same approach here, and briefly offer
some guiding principles.
1. Hit Social Media on Its Head
At its core, an effective social-media instruction must appreciate the
changing nature of the risk and the importance of social media to the
modern-day juror.110 Social media has become part of Americans’ daily
lives; many use Facebook, Twitter and other social networks almost
reflexively, and increasingly from their mobile devices.111 Some jurors may
not even realize that it is wrong to communicate on social media about the
case. And given the extraordinary ability to broadcast oneself on social
media, even one-sided online comments like “I am on jury duty” can invite
responses and start a conversion.112
This brave new world of social media “now requires trial courts to
take additional precautions” to preserve the fairness and integrity of the jury
system.113 Standard “no communication” instructions will no longer do;
110

See For Modern Jurors, Being On a Case Means Being Offline, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (June 24, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/06/24/
195172476/jurors-and-social-media [hereinafter Modern Jurors]. For a succinct
discussion of the dangers specific to social media, see, for example, the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s discussion in Smith, 2013 WL 4804845, at *5–*7, and our prior
discussion, see St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 3.
111
See Modern Jurors, supra note 110; Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Cell
Internet Use 2013, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Cell-Internet.aspx (reporting that 63 percent of
cell-phone users access the internet through their phone).
112
See Martin, supra note 23 (juror struck for saying she was on the jury in a highprofile case). As one New Jersey judge put it, even a seemingly innocent Tweet can
be seen as “an invitation to a conversation.” Modern Jurors, supra note 110.
113
Smith, 2013 WL 4804845, at *9; see also Steiner v. Superior Court, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 155, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“The traditional prohibition against
external communication and outside research must be rewritten to meet the
demands of the twenty-first century.” (quoting Laura Whitney Lee, Note, Silencing
the ‘Twittering Juror’: The Need to Modernize Pattern Cautionary Jury
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courts must explicitly admonish jurors against using Facebook, Twitter, and
other social media to communicate about the case or their jury service
during trial.114 Because the social-media world is constantly changing, the
instruction should use broad language that captures the universe of potential
digital communications tools at jurors’ fingertips. The resulting socialmedia instruction might sound like “something out of a Best Buy catalog”
(as one news report put it),115 but no matter: Specificity is critical and is
becoming the new reality in American courtrooms.116
2. Include a Meaningful Explanation
In stating why she followed the court’s instruction, one juror in our
sample pointed out that the judge “explain[ed]” the rule. Another said that
she “felt the request was justified.” Particularly at a time when restrictions
on social-media use “might feel like solitary confinement” to some,117 it is
important to tell the jury why the restrictions exist. It is not because of some
technical legal formality, but is necessary to ensure the fundamental fairness
of the trial in a variety of ways. By explaining to the jury the important
reasons that underlie the rule, jurors are more likely to be invested in
preserving the integrity of the process and less likely to write off the rule as
unimportant or unnecessary.
3. Remind Jurors of Their Oath and Its Importance
Jurors generally want to do the right thing. They recognize that
“[j]ury service is a duty as well as a privilege of citizenship,” and that their
work is essential to the fair administration of justice.118 Some may cringe at
the prospect of jury duty, but in our experience, nearly all who serve take
their obligation seriously and find the experience personally rewarding. It is
thus not surprising that many jurors in the informal survey referenced their
oaths as the reason they did not communicate about the case on social
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186 (2011))).
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media.119 Staying true to their oath was personal—a source of “pride” for
one, a “civic duty” for another, and a matter of “respect” for several others.
An effective instruction should capitalize on these concepts,
weaving them into the instruction. Rather than threatening jurors with
contempt, jury instructions should remind the jurors of their oath and its
importance, and work in references to civic pride, respect, and democratic
ideals.120 These concepts resonate with jurors and help them to further
appreciate their opportunity to “participate in the administration of justice,”
an opportunity that one scholar has called the “pinnacle of democratic
participation.”121
4. Don’t Forget the Basics
Juror misconduct through social media is a growing concern, but
not all jurors use social media. Even for the vast majority that do, social
media is not the only vehicle through which they can commit misconduct.
One of the jurors in our sample, for example, volunteered that he was not
tempted to use social media, “but I did want to research the case.” A juror in
a recent high-profile case in New York admitted to doing just that, and was
swiftly dismissed from the case (after some stern comments from the
judge).122 And according to another recent report, an Oklahoma state court
juror did something much more basic: She drove by the crime scene during
deliberations.123 The takeaway? Remain vigilant about social media. But
don’t be blinded by it.

CONCLUSION
“The jury system is an institution that is legally fundamental but
also fundamentally human.”124 There is no perfect solution to the growing
risk of juror misconduct associated with social media. But there are
effective ways to mitigate the risk and preserve the fairness and integrity of
the system. Based on informal survey data from 583 actual jurors, we
continue to suggest that courts employ specialized social-media instructions
early and often during trial. Our survey data may be unscientific, but the
voices of actual jurors speak volumes. They tell us that jurors tend to follow
119
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properly crafted social-media instructions; that jurors generally appreciate
their critical role in the judicial process; and that these conclusions apply
with equal force to jurors in both federal and state court.

